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GOVERNMENT APPEALS IN CRIMINAL
CASES: THE 1978 DECISIONS *
by
Edward H. Cooper **
The statute allowing the government to appeal from some forms of
trial court defeat in criminal cases, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3731, has a long and
tangled history. In its 1970 opinion in United States v. Sisson 9ui the
Supreme Court wrestled mightily with a difficult problem under the
statute as it then stood, and invited Congress to amend "this awkward
and ancient Act." Soon afterward the act was amended. It now provides in part that the government may appeal in a criminal case
from a decision, judgment, or order of a district court dismissing an
indictment or information as to any one or more counts, except that
no appeal shall lie where the double jeopardy clause of the United
States Constitution prohibits further prosecution.
The Supreme Court has ruled that this provision was intended by
Congress "to remove all statutory barriers to Government appeals and to
allow appeals whenever the Constitution would permit." This interpretation has forced the Court to move the match to a new arena, putting aside
statutory struggles to grapple with constitutional limitations of its own
perception. Its first major effort came in three 1975 opinions that are
described in detail in 15 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice &
Procedure: Jurisdiction § 3919. A brief summary of some of the major
rules that had seemed to emerge from these decisions is set out below.
This preface is followed by a detailed statement of several more recent
decisions, drawn from the 1978 pocket part supplementing§ 3919. It will
be seen that the Court has not yet succeeded in articulating constitutional
concepts that are clear enough to resolve many of the important questions.
The most difficult problems of government criminal appeals have
involved cases in which jeopardy had attached in the trial court proceedings. In United States v. Wilson,9u 2 the jury found the defendant guilty.
After the verdict, the trial judge dismissed the indictment on the ground
that the defendant had been substantially prejudiced by delay between
the completion of the government investigation and the return of the
* From

the 1978 Pocket Part, 15 Wright,
Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure: Jurisdiction§ 3919

** Edward

H. Cooper is a 1961 graduate of
Dartmouth College and a 1964 graduate of
Harvard Law School. He is a contributing
author to Federal Practice and Procedure:
Jurisdiction (with Wright and Miller) and
is currently a Professor of Law at the
University of Michigan.

96.0 I Sisson case
1970, 90 S.Ct." 2117, 399 U.S. 267, 26
L.Ed.2d 608.
96.02 Wilson case
1975, 95 S.Ct. 1013, 420 U.S. 332, 43
L.Ed.2d 232.
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indictment. The Court ruled that the government could appeal from this
dismissal. It found that appeal would not violate any of three separate
purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause: to prevent the government
from seeking to persuade a second trier of fact of the defendant's guilt;
to foreclose the opportunity to revise the government's trial strategy in
light of lessons learned at the first trial; and to protect the defendant's
interest in the finality of a verdict of acquittal. Although the trial judge
had dismissed on grounds that did not go to the factual elements of guilt,
the opinion in the Wilson case and the opinions in the contemporary
decisions seemed to indicate that the government could appeal if a jury
conviction were followed by an acquittal based on the trial judge's
evaluation of the evidence. It was clear then, however, and it remains
clear today that if a jury has acquitted the government cannot appeal.
United States v. Jenkins 9u 3 was decided the same day as the Wilson
case. The Court ruled that the government could not appeal from a
judgment dismissing an indictment entered after a trial held to the court
without a jury since reversal would have required remand to the trial
court for further factfinding. The opinion clearly stated that appeal
could not be had even if the further findings could be made without
taking additional evidence-it was enough to preclude an appeal that
"further proceedings of some sort, devoted to the resolution of factual
issues going to the elements of the offense charged, would have been
required * * *." On the other hand, the opinion indicated that if the
trial judge had made sufficient specific findings of fact to support a
judgment of guilt under proper legal rules without the need for any
further factfinding, appeal would be proper.
The third 1975 decision, Serfass v. United States,96.IN actually dealt with
an appeal from a dismissal ordered before jeopardy had attached. The
opinion, however, expressly left open the question whether appeals might
be permitted in cases in which jeopardy had attached but the trial had not
been pushed to a general conclusion of guilt or innocence. The Court was
clearly concerned that a defendant might deliberately delay presenting a
question that could be raised prior to trial in hopes of securing a
nonappealable dismissal after jeopardy had attached.
The double jeopardy tests suggested by these three decisions for
appeals by the government in criminal cases in which jeopardy has
attached have been changed substantially by a series of subsequent
Supreme Court decisions. The important cases have dealt with prosecutions that were in some part tried to a jury but terminated short of a jury
verdict. Some of the cases, however, have dealt with judge trials. A few
clear new lessons have emerged, and the opinions suggest that many of
the lessons that had seemed clear may have to be relearned. It is
difficult to believe that the Court has yet charted the course it will
ultimately follow.
96.03 Jenkins case
1975, 95 S.Ct. 1006, 420 U.S. 358, 43
L.Ed.2d 250.

96.04 Serfass case
1975, 95 S.Ct. 1055, 420 U.S. 377, 43
L.Ed.2d 265.
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An introductory example may help prepare the way for the exposition
that follows. At the close of the government's evidence in a prosecution
for armed robbery, the defendant seeks dismissal on two grounds. One is
prejudicial preindictment delay. The other is failure to offer any evidence that the hammer was cocked on the loaded automatic pistol the
def end ant was carrying. If dismissal is granted on the ground of
preindictment delay, the government can appeal even though jeopardy
had clearly attached and reversal would require a complete retrial. This
result appears to follow even though the defendant was astute to raise
the question of preindictment delay before jeopardy had attached, and
even though no reason is offered for delaying disposition of the question
until midtrial. On the other hand, no appeal can be taken from a
judgment of dismissal resting on the ground that the government has
failed to prove that the hammer was cocked as an essential element of the
offense charged, no matter how wrong the trial court may be in concluding that this fact is an essential element of the offense. This result,
emphasizing the importance of fact-based judgments as "acquittals,"
might be expanded in future decisions to preclude appeal even though a
jury has already convicted, or even though the trial court sitting without
a jury has specifically found sufficient facts to support conviction on the
correct view of the law. Accurate statement of the changes of law that
underlie this illustration and of the ambiguities that remain requires
extensive exploration of the major cases.
The first case that fits into the major sequence is United States v.
Martin Linen Supply Co.96·1 The Court ruled that the government could
not appeal from a judgment of acquittal entered on a motion made under
Criminal Rule 29(c) after the jury had become "hopelessly deadlocked" in
a criminal contempt trial. The motions were made, at the suggestion of
the trial court, six days after discharge of the jury. They were granted
on the ground that the government had not proved facts constituting
criminal contempt. It was noted that the judgment clearly rested on an
evaluation of the government's evidence,96.2 a matter that has come to
have great importance in subsequent opinions.96.3 It was pointed out that
a successful appeal would require further trial court proceedings, a test
that has been modified in the later cases. Finally, and most important, it
was concluded that a ruling on a timely motion for judgment of acquittal
made after a jury has proved unable to reach a verdict occurs during the
period of jeopardy commenced by the initial trial; the ruling cannot be
96.1 Martin Linen Supply case
1977, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 430 U.S. 564, 51
L.Ed.2d 642, noted, 1978, 46 U.Cin.L.Rev.
1055.
96.2 Evaluation of evidence
"[W]e must determine whether the ruling
of the judge, whatever its label, actually
represents a resolution, correct or not, of
some or all of the factual elements of the
offense charged. * * * [I]t is plain
that the District .:::ourt in this case evaluated the government's evidence and deter-

mined that it was legally insufficient to
sustain a conviction." 97 S.Ct. at 13541355 (per Brennan, J.).

96.3 Fact determinations
The proposition that earlier cases did not
tum on the presence or absence of factual
determinations is discussed in 15 Wright,
Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure: Jurisdiction § 3919, pp. 664-665
(hereafter cited as main volume).
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treated simply as if it were a pretrial matter arising before jeopardy had
attached at the second trial that otherwise might follow.
It would have been easy to reach an opposite result. It is clear that
double jeopardy principles permit a second trial after a mistrial resulting
from failure of the jury to agree. 96_. It had at least seemed equally clear
that the government could appeal if the jury had returned a guilty
verdict, followed by entry of a judgment of acquittal. 96•5 These rules
could easily be combined in the proposition that a judgment of acquittal
based on an evaluation of trial evidence does not preclude appeal, and
that the need for a second trial does not preclude appeal if the need arises
from failure of the jury to agree. One way of expressing this proposition
would be that jeopardy attached at the beginning of the first jury trial,
and was released at the time the jury was discharged for failure to agree.
The Court's contrary conclusion was that jeopardy continued its hold
through the time of the ruling on the timely motion for judgment of
acquittal. This conclusion was explained in part on the ground that the
trial judge's authority to enter a judgment of acquittal is an additional
protection for filtering out deficient prosecutions. This explanation does
not explain why appeal may be taken from a judgment of acquittal
entered after a jury verdict of guilty. In addition, the Court explained
that it would be anomalous to allow appealability to turn on the timing of
the judgment of acquittal. It was accepted on all sides that if judgment
of acquittal were entered at the close of the government's case, or at the
close of all the evidence without submission to the jury, no appeal could
be taken. The same rule should follow, according to the Court, if the trial
court prefers to consider the motion more deliberately. If anything, such
deliberate consideration gives the government more protection against
improvident action by the trial court.
If no more were at stake than construction of the appeal statute, it
would be difficult to disagree with the Court's choice between these
conflicting arguments. The opinion, however, is faithful to the rule that
the statute is intended to remove all statutory barriers, and to permit
96.4 Retrial after hung jury
"The normal policy granting the Government the right to retry a defendant after a
mistrial that does not determine the outcome of a trial * * * is not applicable
since valid judgments of acquittal were
entered * * *." 97 S.Ct. at 1354.
So too, government appeal is allowed if a
mistrial resulting from a hung jury is followed by an order of dismissal rather than
a judgment of acquittal. See U. S. v. Sanford, 1976, 97 S.Ct. 20, 429 U.S. 14, 50
L.Ed.2d 17, described at note 75 below in
this supplement.

96.5 Guilty verdict
See pages 664-665 in the main volume
and the new text at notes 96.38 to 96.43
below.

In U. S. v. Allison, C.A.7th, 1977, 535 F.2d
1385, 1386-1387, it is concluded that the
decision in the Martin Linen Supply Company case does not preclude government
appeal from a judgment of acquittal entered after a jury verdict of guilt. The
guilty verdict means that no further trial
proceedings would be required in the
event of reversal.
The government could appeal from a judgment of acquittal entered after a jury
guilty verdict, since success on appeal
would not lead to a retrial. The Martin
Linen Supply Company decision did not
require a contrary conclusion. U. S. v.
Boyd, C.A.5th, 1978, 566 F.2d 929, 931932.
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appeal whenever it would be constitutional to do so.96•6 The Court's rule
is thus apparently binding on state courts, so long as state procedure on
motions for acquittal is sufficiently similar to federal procedure. Given
the initial premise that double jeopardy permits a new trial after failure
of the jury to agree, the present rule .makes little sense as a matter of
constitutional compulsion. The strongest argument would be that the
trial judge's factual determination that the evidence was insufficient to
support conviction should protect the defendant against the risks that
otherwise attend a proper mistrial. In the face of one clear ruling
against the sufficiency of the evidence, the government should not be
allowed to harass the defendant, seek a more favorable factfinder in a
second jury, or improve its presentation in light of lessons learned at the
first trial. This argument, however, loses its force when set against the
ruling a few months earlier that the government may appeal a dismissal
resting on the insufficiency of the evidence presented at a first trial
resulting in a hung jury if the dismissal occurs after the close of the
jeopardy period that attached at the first trial and before jeopardy has
attached at the second trial.96.7 It is difficult to attach constitutional
significance to the number of days that have elapsed between discharge
of the hung jury and the motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence. 96.s
Unless there is to be an absolute protection against further proceedings
whenever dismissal rests on an evaluation of the evidence presented at
the first trial, it would be better to rule that as a matter of constitutional
doctrine jeopardy is released upon proper discharge of the jury for failure
to agree. 96·9
Although no government appeal was actually involved, the next case to
change the nature of the uncertainty surrounding post-jeopardy appeals
by the government is Lee v. United States.96.10 Immediately before the
start of trial to the court, and before jeopardy had attached, defense
counsel moved to dismiss the information charging theft for failure to
include charges of knowledge and of intent to deprive the victim of his
property. The court denied the motion, but made it clear that the motion
would be reconsidered. At the end of the trial, the court observed that
the defendant was obviously guilty, but granted the motion to dismiss.
96.6 Remove statutory barriers
See page 664 in the main volume.
96.7 Dismissal between jeopardy periods
U. S. v. Sanford, 1976, 97 S.Ct. 20, 429
U.S. 14, 50 L.Ed.2d 17.
96.8 Days elapsed
Criminal Rule 29(c) allows a motion for
judgment of acquittal to be made within
seven days after discharge of the jury, or
within such further time as the court may
direct during the seven day period. It
does not seem probable that practice in
the various states follows the very same
time limit.
96.9 Discharge of jury
At the time the Martin Linen Supply Company case was decided the ruling that

jeopardy continued through the period for
making a post-trial motion for acquittal
carried greater consequences than it does
today. Until the decision in U.S. v. Scott,
1978, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 437 U.S. 82, 57
L.Ed.2d 65, an appeal that would require
further trial court proceedings would apparently have been blocked even though
the judgment rested on matters apart from
factual innocence. See text at notes 96.13
to 96.18 below.

96. IO Lee case
1977, 97 S.Ct. 2141, 432 U.S. 23, 53
L.Ed.2d 80.
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No appeal was taken. Instead, an improved information was filed and
the defendant was convicted after a second trial. The court ruled that
the conviction did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Initially, it was accepted that the dismissal was not an acquittal, since
it did not rest on any resolution of factual issues in favor of the
defendant. Next, it was concluded that the "dismissal" was functionally
equivalent to a mistrial, since it clearly rested solely on the insufficiency
of the information, and was granted in apparent contemplation of a
second trial. Turning thus to the standards regulating second jeopardy
after a mistrial, the Court found that further prosecution was permissible
because the first prosecution was terminated at the defendant's request,
and had not resulted from any intentional overreaching by the government.
The result in the Lee case made it clear that the government's right to
appeal cannot be controlled by the bare fact that the motion to dismiss
was made before jeopardy had attached. It would be absurd to rule that
although double jeopardy principles allow institution of a new proceeding,
they prevent continuation of the initial proceeding by appeal. After this
initial point of departure, however, it remained possible to argue that the
result depended on the laxity or possible tactical astuteness of counsel.
The motion to dismiss was made by Lee's counsel at the start of trial,
although there had been ample opportunity to seek dismissal earlier. The
Court suggested that the failure of the trial court to postpone taking
evidence until the motion could be considered carefully was reasonable in
light of this timing and the failure of defense counsel to request a
continuance or otherwise seek to avoid the attachment of jeopardy.
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion stressed that an entirely different
case would be presented if the petitioner had afforded the trial judge
ample opportunity to rule on the motion before trial.96•11
The facts of the Lee case, then, were at least consistent with a rule that
would deny a second prosecution or appeal if the defendant had been
careful to provide ample opportunity to dispose of any objections to the
prosecution before jeopardy had attached. If such a rule were adopted, it
would require difficult factual determinations of the degree of care to be
required in each case. On the other hand, it would have two great
virtues. First, it would enable a defendant to secure protection against
the burdens of a second trial without any need to inquire into the
strength of the trial court's reasons for postponing determination of the
objections until jeopardy had attached. 96•12 Second, it would prevent
96.l I Justice Brennan
97 S.Ct. at 2148.
96.12 Trial court reasons
The better rule suggested by a test that
permits appeal and further trial proceedings only if the defendant has failed to
raise issues available before trial until
jeopardy has attached is that if the issues
have been raised properly, failure of the
trial court to reach them until after jeopar-

dy has attached does not justify an appeal.
Deliberately distorted action by a trial
court, however, could create a strong
pressure to permit an appeal ~ven though
the defendant had done everything possible to present the matters before trial.
Such pressures are demonstrated in a set
of cases from the Tenth Circuit. In two
cases reported as U. S. v. Appawoo, C.A.
10th, 1977, 553 F.2d 1242, the defendants
made similar pretrial motions to dismiss
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defendants from deliberately or negligently deferring objections that
could be raised before trial, thereby forestalling a second prosecution by
waiting until jeopardy had attached. Later decisions, however, may
preclude this approach.
The clearest of the new cases is United States v. Scott.96•13 A defendant
charged in a three count indictment moved before trial, and twice during
trial, to dismiss two of the counts on grounds of preindictment delay. At
the close of all the evidence the trial court granted the motion, and
submitted only the third count to the jury. The government sought to
appeal as to one of the dismissed counts. The court of appeals, relying on
the rule announced in United States v. Jenkins,96.14 dismissed the appeal
since reversal would require further trial court proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed, squarely overruling the further trial proceedings
portion of the three-year old decision in the Jenkins case. For purposes
of a second trial, it was found that the Lee case "demonstrated that, at
least in some cases, the dismissal of an indictment may be treated on the
same basis as the declaration of a mistrial." Two requirements were
established for permitting a retrial on this analogy: The trial court must
not have relied on insufficiency of the evidence to establish guilt, and the
defendant must be responsible for the second prosecution. The requirement that dismissal not be based on insufficiency of the evidence was
explained on the ground that a resolution of some or all of the factual
elements of the offense charged in favor of the defendant, whether
correct or not, is an acquittal. 96•15 If there has been an acquittal, "the law
attaches particular significance" to it for fear that a right of appeal
on the ground that the statute underlying
the prosecution was unconstitutional.
The trial court refused to hear the motions
before trial began, and in one case expressly stated that the refusal rested on
the desire to prevent appellate review by
deferring any ruling until jeopardy had
attached. In each case, after the jury was
sworn and some government testimony
adduced, a judgment of acquittal was entered on the basis of the unconstitutionality of the statute. Appeals were allowed,
on the ground that in light of the trial
judge's motivations, "there was in fact no
jeopardy." This conclusion, however, was
tied tightly to the observation that the trial
court rulings had not been related to any
facts developed by the government's case
or any other facts. In U. S. v. Fay, C.A.
10th, 1977, 553 F.2d 1247, on the other
hand, pretrial motions to suppress were
put off by the same trial judge until after
the government had presented nine witnesses. Thereafter the motions were
heard, suppression was ordered, and following brief pro forma appearances by a
few more government witnesses a verdict
of acquittal was directed. Although the
court of appeals took it that the procedure
followed "obviously aborted a proper consideration of the motions to suppress," it
dismissed the appeal on the ground that
BJ

F.R.D

18

the trial judge had rested on consideration
of the evidence presented and had not
abused his discretion.
Under the more recent Supreme Court decisions discussed below, it seems almost
certain that appeal would be denied in the
Fay case on the ground that the defendant
had been acquitted. Appeal could be allowed in the Appawoo case if it were
concluded that the constitutionality of the
statute creating the offense does not go to
the elements of the crime charged. See
text at notes 96.13 to 96.18 below. The
prospect of permitting appeal in these circumstances may be one of the advantages
of discarding the further trial court proceedings test.

96.13 Scott case
1978, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 437 U.S. 82, 57
L.Ed.2d 65.
96. I 4 Jenkins case

1975, 95 S.Ct. 1006, 420 U.S. 358, 43
L.Ed.2d 250, discussed at pages 666-668
in the main volume.
96. I 5 Acquittal

98 S.Ct. at 2196-2197.
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would permit the government to wear down the defendant so that even
though innocent he might be found guilty. The requirement that the
defendant be responsible for securing the dismissal was imposed to justify
the conclusion that the defendant has no substantial claim to have guilt
decided by the first jury empaneled to hear the case or to be free from
the burdens of a second trial:
We think that in a case such as this the defendant, by deliberately
choosing to seek termination of the proceedings against him on a
basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence of the offense of which
he is accused, suffers no injury cognizable under the Double Jeopardy
Clause if the Government is permitted to appeal from such a ruling
of the trial court in favor of the defendant. We do not thereby adopt
the doctrine of "waiver" of double jeopardy. "' * * Rather, we
conclude that the Double Jeopardy Clause, which guards against
Government oppression, does not relieve a defendant from the consequences of his voluntary choice. * * "' [I]n the present case,
respondent successfully avoided * * * a submission of the first
count of the indictment by persuading the trial court to dismiss it on
a basis which did not depend on guilt or innocence. He was thus
neither acquitted nor convicted, because he himself successfully undertook to persuade the trial court not to submit the issue of guilt or
innocence to the jury which had been empaneled to try him. 9u 6
The Court added two final observations. First, it stated that denial of a
government right of appeal would mean only that "the public has been
deprived of its valued right to 'one complete opportunity to convict those
who have violated its laws.' " Second, it concluded that concern with the
defendant's interest in completing the original trial to the original jury
could be satisfied in many cases by completing the trial through jury
verdict and then ruling on questions that were not decided prior to trial.
The fact that Scott had raised the preindictment delay issue before trial
suggests that whatever might have been guessed from the Lee case and
earlier decisions the government's right to appeal does not depend on the
defendant's failure to provide adequate opportunity to dispose of defenses
before jeopardy has attached.96.17 Nothing in the Court's opinion suggests
that there had been any neglect or sharp tactical practice. The Court's
failure to inquire whether there was any good reason for the trial court to
defer ruling on the question may also suggest that the government can
96.16 No cognizable Injury
98 S.Ct. at 2197-2198 (per Rehnquist, J.).
96.17 Tardy defense motions
See the discussion at pages 677-684 in the
main volume.
The decision in the Scott case provides a
new basis for confirming the result in such
cases as U.S. v. Wagstaff, C.A.IOth, 1978,
572 F.2d 270. The court permitted the
government to appeal from an order dismissing the indictment on a motion that
apparently was made for the first time
immediately after the jury was empaneled

and sworn. The court relied on Lee v. U.
S., described in the text at notes 96.10 to
96.12 above, for the proposition that "The
impaneling and swearing of the jury no
longer carries the magic which it once
had." Instead, it was found important
that the proceeding had terminated at the
request of the defendant, and even more
important that the dismissal rested on a
deficiency in the indictment that "was
merely a lack of proper pleading rather
than a defect in the case, whereby the
accused can never be convicted."
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appeal even though there was no good reason to put the question off to
trial. On the other hand, it may remain possible to argue in future cases
that it is so often important to assess the impact of preindictment delay in
light of the case made at trial that the Court must have assumed there
was good reason to defer the ruling. A showing that the trial judge
deliberately failed to rule on a pretrial motion without good reason may
yet enable a defendant to defeat a government appeal by arguing that
there was insufficient reason to defeat his interest in completing the
original trial before the original jury.
The decision in the Scott case was challenged by a vigorous dissent
joined by four justices. Much of the dissent rested on a judgment that
the constitutional policy against multiple trials requires that the government rely less on appeal and more on the opportunity to dissuade the trial
court from committing errors in favor of the accused. In addition, it was
argued that the Court had utterly failed to provide any suitable guidance
for applying in future cases its distinction between judgments that would
qualify as acquittals because resting on factual determinations of such
matters of guilt as entrapment or insanity, and judgments that would not
qualify as acquittals because resting on factual determinations of such
matters as preindictment delay. 96.18 Finally, the dissenters were willing to
admit the possibility of government appeal from dismissals based on
defense motions that should have been made before trial. This view may
at least prove persuasive when the Court faces the problem of unnecessarily delayed decision of questions properly raised before jeopardy had
attached.
In contrast to the relative clarity of the Scott decision, the decision in
Sanabria v. United States 96.t9 presents great complexities. Equally great
uncertainties arise from the Court's effort to untangle the complexities.
Sanabria was one of eleven defendants charged with violating a federal
statute that prohibits participation in an illegal gambling business. One
of the elements of the offense is that the business violate the law of the
state in which it is conducted. The indictment charged involvement with
a business that involved betting on horse races and a "numbers" game in
violation of § 17 of a Massachusetts statute. The evidence offered by the
government was sufficient to connect Sanabria with the numbers operation, but not with the horse betting. The numbers operation, however,
violated § 7 rather than § 17 of the Massachusetts statute. The trial
court granted a motion to acquit Sanabria at the close of the government's case on the basis of a ruling that the evidence of numbers
96.18 Matters of guilt
The dissent added that application of the
Court's examples may lead to double jeopardy distinctions that depend upon the
substantive law of a particular jurisdiction.
If entrapment, for example, is
viewed not as a matter of defeating the
mens rea element of the offense but as an
affirmative defense based on offic;ial misconduct, a judgment based on entrapment
might permit a government appeal. The

dissent urged that "when all is said and
done, there will be few instances indeed in
which defenses can be deemed unrelated
to factual innocence. If so, today's decision may be limited to disfavored doctrines like preaccusation delay." 98 S.Ct.
at 2206.

96. I 9 Sanabria case
1978, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 437 U.S. 54, 57
L.Ed.2d 43.
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operations must be stricken for failure to allege the proper section of the
state statute, and a conclusion that there was not sufficient evidence to
connect Sanabria with the horse operation. The Supreme Court decided
the case on the assumption that the trial court was twice wrong. Failure
to allege the proper section of the state statute was assumed to be
harmless error, as found by the court of appeals, on the ground that
Sanabria had clear notice of the offense charged. In addition, even if it
were assumed that the business could not be found illegal on the basis of
the numbers operation, Sanabria could be convicted by showing that he
had participated in the numbers operation of a single business that was
made unlawful by its horse betting operations, even though he had no
connection with the horse betting. Nonetheless, the Court concluded that
the government could not appeal. Each of the three major portions of its
opinion is difficult to unravel.
The initial problem concerned characterization of the district court's
actions. The government argued that the district court had treated the
single count of the indictment as involving separate numbers and horse
betting charges. It conceded that the horse betting charge was resolved
by an acquittal and could not be appealed, but it urged that the numbers
charge was dismissed for failure to allege the proper statutory section
and that such a dismissal could be appealed. The Court, however,
concluded that the form of the indictment and the trial court orders
precluded this treatment. Instead, it found that the district court had
relied on its erroneous interpretation of the indictment in arriving at a
doubly erroneous decision to exclude the numbers evidence; and had then
entered a judgment of acquittal as to the entire count for lack of
sufficient evidence. There is no more reasoning offered than the conclusion that the order must be treated as a fact-based acquittal, and that no
appeal can ever be taken from a fact-based acquittal.
In its own terms, this first portion of the Court's opinion would be more
satisfying if the Court had gone beyond talismanic reliance on the
acquittal phrase. It is far from self-evident that double jeopardy principles must preclude appeal and retrial as to every judgment that rests
upon insufficiency of the evidence, even though the insufficiency ruling
results from erroneous legal rulings that lead to complete disregard of
sufficient evidence, and even though the government has never even
pressed the theory found to lack sufficient factual support. It is even less
clear why appeal and retrial must be precluded when the controlling
question-the sufficiency of the allegation that a numbers operation
violates state law-could easily have been raised by pretrial motion and
the defense can neither offer any satisfactory explanation of its failure to
raise the question 96.20 nor even assert any claim of prejudice.96.21 Elabo96.20 No satisfactory explanation
Defense counsel in the Sanabria case explained to the trial court that the objection
to citation of the wrong state statutory
section in the indictment had not been
made earlier because it had not "ripened"
until the court was asked to take judicial

notice of the limitations on the section
cited in the indictment at the close of the
government's case.

96.21 No prejudice
Defense counsel in the Sanabria case responded · to the district court's inquiry

GOVERNMENT CRIMINAL APPEALS

549

Cite as 81 F.R.D. 539

rate justifications are possible, but they must be articulated before they
can be assessed or their consequences can be predicted.
The most persuasive justification for the Court's concentration on
fact-based acquittals by a trial judge may be introduced by repeating the
contrast between the Scott and Sanabria decisions. In the Scott case, the
Court concluded that if the defendant seeks dismissal on grounds other
than factual proof of guilt there is no need to invoke the double jeopardy
policies protecting the defendant against harassment and possible mistaken conviction through "improvement" of the government's case. At the
same time, faithful to the decisions in Sanabria and the other recent
cases, it recognized that the same double jeopardy policies do apply if the
dismissal constitutes an acquittal for insufficient proof of some element
of the offense. This distinction is puzzling on its face. A defendant who
believes the evidence insufficient, but who fears harassment or a less
favorable jury or evidence at a second trial, need not seek acquittal prior
to submission to the jury. Instead, he may persist to verdict in the
expectation that the jury will acquit, and still seek acquittal if by chance
the jury should convict. This path would have the great advantage of
facilitating appellate review, permitting reinstatement of the jury's verdict if it is concluded that the trial judge erred in directing an acquittal.96.22 It would be easy to conclude that defendants should be put to the
choice of finishing the first trial or terminating the first trial only on
penalty of exposure to appeal and retrial.
This argument can be rejected most easily by assigning a special
protective role to the trial judge. The recent development of government
appeals opportunities has created the first real need to reflect on the trial
judge's role in directing acquittal. In its most recent statement, the
Court has indicated casually that the trial judge "is not to weigh the
evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses," and indeed must apparently apply the same standards as an appellate court.96.23 Such a limited
role is difficult to reconcile with the heavy emphasis on the significance of
fact-based directed judgments of acquittal. The recent government
appeal decisions can be justified much more easily if a more important
and partly discretionary role is assigned to the trial judge.96.24 Factual
control of the jury may be found an integral part of jury trial, a
protection against the excesses of prosecution and jury combined that is
about prejudice arising from the statutory
citation in the indictment by stating that
he need not and did not allege actual prejudice.

96.22 Reinstate verdict
The question whether government appeals
may still be justified on the ground that
they would simply require reinstatement
of the jury verdict is discussed in the text
at notes 96.38 to 96.43 below.
96.23 Acquittal standard
Burks v. U. S., 1978, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2150,
437 U.S. I, 57 L.Ed.2d I.

96.24 Discretionary role
The traditional standard has been cast in
terms that do not include any evident
measure of discretion. See Vol. 2, § 467.
This standard makes evident sense when
applied in the traditional setting of appeal
by a defendant who claims that i was
error to deny a judgment of acquittal after
conviction by the jury. It could make
sense as well in the setting of appeal by
the government from a directed judgment
of acquittal entered before or after submission to the jury, but only if appeal by
the government were allowed.
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as important as the jury's protection against possible excesses by prosecution and court combined. The trial judge's fact-based decision to acquit,
based on the entire experience of trial, could well deserve protection
against remote appellate control. Just as appeal may not be taken from a
general judgment of acquittal entered after trial to the court, appeal may
be denied from a general judgment of acquittal entered before a jury
verdict.
Acceptance of this role for trial judge acquittal directly explains only
the easy case in which the trial judge has identified the correct elements
of the offense charged and has found the evidence insufficient to support
conviction as to one or more of those elements. It does not explain why
appeal should be denied if the acquittal results from legal error. The
paradigm situation that presents the strongest justification for government appeal can be presented by embellishing the Sanabria case. The
trial judge might have stated explicitly that as a matter of law a horse
betting business is illegal in Massachusetts; that there was sufficient
evidence to support findings that a single business existed that engaged
in both horse betting and a numbers operation, and that Sanabria
engaged in the numbers operation; that to support a conviction under the
present indictment it must be shown that Sanabria was connected with
the horse betting; and that Sanabria must be acquitted for want of
sufficient evidence that he was personally involved in the horse betting.
The argument in favor of permitting appeal by the government in these
circumstances can be drawn straight from the Scott decision. All of the
fact rulings of the trial judge would be accepted. No effort need be
made to review the ruling as to the sufficiency of the horse betting
evidence against the defendant. The only issues to be reviewed would be
legal issues going to the sufficiency of the indictment and the substantive
requirements of the offense charged. As in the Scott case, the retrial
measure of double jeopardy policy can be put aside because the defendant
himself sought to terminate the first prosecution short of a jury verdict.
Protection against the burdens and hazards of retrial would be required
only if the defendant was forced to seek termination of the first trial by
official overreaching.96.25
96.25 Official misconduct
The difference between the double jeopardy standards that apply when a mistrial is
declared on motion of the court or prosecution and those that apply when a mistrial is declared at the request of the defendant is sketched in U. S. v. Dinitz,
1976, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 424 U.S. 600, 47
L.Ed.2d 267. Bad-faith conduct by judge
01' prosecutor that threatens to force the
defendant to seek a retrial may preclude a
second trial after a mistrial. Otherwise
the defendant's request ordinarily means
that lie mistrial itself serves the same
purposes of protecting the defendant that
are often served by the protection against
double jeopardy; if double jeopardy principles precluded retrial, defense motions

for a mistrial would commonly be denied
in favor of completing the trial and requiring reversal on appeal, thereby increasing
the burdens borne ty the defendant.
A government appeal was dismissed because the defendant had been forced to
seek a mistrial because of government
overreaching in V. S. v. Kessler, C.A.5th,
1976, 530 F.2d 1246.
A very important test of the overreaching
standard could be presented by the setting
of V. S. v. Kehoe, C.A.5th, 1978, 573 F.2d
335. The defendants, directors of a savings and loan association, were first prosecuted for embezzlement on account of
profits realized by transactions in land belonging to the association. A judgment of
acquittal was entered at the close of the
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Arguments against a right of government appeal on issues of law
following termination of the original trial at the request of the defendant
must be drawn largely from practical concerns. Perhaps the most
important practical concern is that trial judges cannot be relied upon to
provide in every case a detailed set of rulings that carefully separate legal
and factual conclusions. In many cases a motion for judgment of
acquittal may be granted without any explanation, so that it is impossible
to isolate issues of iaw for appeal. In other cases-and the Sanabria case
itself may be one-the statement by the trial judge may be ambiguous, so
that even if appellate courts are prepared to undertake a time-consuming
effort to separate factual and legal elements the results of the effort will
be to leave the right to appeal uncertain and to risk mistaken identification of the factual elements. It would be easy to distrust a system in
which the finality of a pre-verdict acquittal depends on the discretionary
determination of the trial court whether to make any findings, and on the
care and skill exhibited in the findings that are made.
Other practical concerns as well may weigh against a right of government appeal, but they seem less important. It is possible that findings
adverse to the defendant may not be considered carefully when acquittal
is ordered on other grounds, but the findings need not bind later proceedings and it seems unimportant to speculate that a fact-based acquittal
might have been ordered if the trial court had viewed the law differently.
A right of government appeal might encourage defendants to avoid
pre-verdict acquittals, on the view that the jury is apt to acquit and
thereby foreclose any appeal if it is instructed on the legal views that
would lead the court to direct acquittal. This possible reaction does not
impose sue!. costs on the judicial system or on defendants as to merit
much concern.
One final difficulty remains with this first portion of the Sanabria
opm1on. For whatever reasons, it is established-at least for the time
being-that the government may not appeal if a pre-verdict judgment of
acquittal rests on a trial court assessment of the sufficiency of the
government's case on the ground that the
embezzlement statute did not apply to real
property. The defendants were then convicted under a second indictment charging
that the same transactions violated a statute prohibiting receipt of property through
any act of the association with intent to
defraud it. In an opinion rendered a bare
few weeks before the Scott and Sanabria
decisions, the court overruled its own prior decision in the same case, C.A.5th,
1975, 516 F.2d 78, certiorari denied 96
S.Ct. 1103, 424 U.S. 909, 47 L.Ed.2d 313,
and held that double jeopardy precluded
the second prosecution. A major portion
of its reasoning was that dismissal of the
first case could not be treated as a mistrial
since the determination that the indictment did not state an offense clearly
meant that the trial judge did not contemplate a second prosecution for violation of

the embezzlement statute that was the
sole statute charged in the first indictment. It was further found unimportant
that the defendant had requested termination of the first proceeding by dismissal,
and that the motion had been made only
after conclusion of the government's case.
In light of the decision in the Scott case, it
would be easy to conclude that the
government could appeal, or alternatively
could proceed by a second indictment, because the defendant had requested a termination of the first proceeding on
grounds that presumably were available
well before jeopardy had ~ttached. It
would be even better to permit an appeal
from the dismissal of the first indictment
but prohibit a second indictment for the
reasons suggested at page 683 of the main
volume, but nothing in the Court's opinions yet supports that result.
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evidence, no matter how clearly mistaken the trial court may have been
in requiring any proof whatever of the matters involved. The trial court
action in such circumstances, however, need not be framed as a judgment
of acquittal for failure to prove the offense charged. Instead, the court
may state that the government clearly has proved an offense but has
failed to charge it. The apparent lesson of the Lee decision 96.26 is that if
the trial court acts by dismissing the indictment, the judgment may be
treated as a mistrial and an appeal may be available. If this conclusion is
correct, it means that the trial court has discretion to control the double
jeopardy consequences of its ruling by choosing the form employed. It
also means that the government must be astute to argue for a disposition
that leaves it free to appeal or start over. Although it is troubling that
trial judges should be left with discretion to determine whether their
legal rulings should be free from appellate review, procedural punctilio at
least has the advantage of helping the defendant to know whether
further proceedings may be possible. Even this virtue may be reduced,
however, until the "manifest necessity" standard that limits retrials after
a mistrial or dismissal without the defendant's consent 96.2'7 is elaborated in
the context of defective indictments.
The second portion of the Sanabria opinion states that the government
could not have appealed even if the Court had accepted its argument that
the numbers charge had been merely "dismissed." The point of departure is a ruling that connection with a single gambling business is a single
federal offense for double jeopardy purposes, no matter how many
discrete violations of state law the business has committed. Sanabria was
"truly acquitted" of connection with this single business, according to the
Court, by the conclusion that he was not connected with its horse betting
operations. The Court twice referred to the district court statement as if
it had been found that Sanabria was not connected with any part of the
overall single business, but it also recognized in separate passages that in
fact it was only found that Sanabria was not connected with the horse
betting aspects of the single business. These two perceptions were never
reconciled. More important, no effort was made to explain why a "true
acquittal" should be found in a judgment that did not in any way purport
to conclude that Sanabria was not connected with the single business, and
that became important only because of the erroneous premise that
Sanabria could be convicted under the indictment only if proved to have
been connected with the horse betting. If the Court meant the "true
acquittal" phrase to characterize a decision based on failure to prove guilt
96.26 Lee case
Lee v. U. S., 1977, 97 S.Ct. 2141, 432 U.S.
23, 53 L.Ed.2d 80, discussed at notes 96.10
to 96. ll above.
It is not entirely clear that a government
appeal could be taken in the circumstances suggested in the text. A judgment of
acquittal was found, and the appeal dismissed, in U. S. v. Hospital Monteflores,
Inc., C.A.lst, 1978, 575 F.2d 332, 333 & n.
1, where the judgment dismissing the indictment at the end of the prosecution's

case rested on an evaluation of the facts
and a conclusion that whether or not they
might prove some illegality they did not
prove the crime charged.

96.27 Manifest necessity
The manifest necessity test for retrial after
a mistrial declared at the request of the
prosecution is explored in Arizona v.
Washington, 1978, 98 S.Ct. 824, 434 U.S.
497, 54 L.Ed.2d 717.
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of any offense, rather than failure to prove guilt of the offense as the
district court mistakenly found it to have been charged, this portion of
the opinion could make sense only if there had been a finding that
Sanabria was not connected with any aspect of the single business. On
the other hand, if the Court meant only that the judgment was a true
acquittal because it would bar a second prosecution for any part of the
single offense charged, the effect of the decision is diminished by the
Court's prompt recognition that a new prosecution could be brought-or
an appeal could be taken-if it had been charged that there were two
separate gambling businesses, one for horse betting and one for numbers
betting. It further admitted that "it is not always easy to ascertain
whether one or more gambling businesses has been proven." 96.28 The
difficulty was avoided in this case only because the government had
chosen throughout to treat it as a single business. If indeed Sanabria
was connected only with the numbers operation, it might have been easy
to assert that two or more businesses were involved. It is easily conceivable that the scope of double jeopardy protection will come to depend on
the array of tactical considerations that lead to government efforts to
characterize a loosely organized enterprise as one or more businesses, and
on the extent to which courts can give greater definition to the contours
of a single business.96.29
The final portion of the Sanabria opinion rejects two theories urged by
the government to show that double jeopardy claims had been waived. A
theory that protection had been waived by moving to dismiss the numbers
allegation, in reliance on the mistrial analogy adopted in the Lee case,96.30
was rejected because there had been a fact-found acquittal and because
the trial court did not contemplate further prosecution. A theory that
the defendant should have objected before trial to the failure to allege
the proper section of the state statute was rejected because the sufficiency of the proof that may be presented at trial is not a legal defense
required to be raised before trial. The only problem presented by this
portion of the opinion stems from the first two portions. The critical
shortcoming was the failure of the indictment to specify the proper
section of the state statute violated by a numbers operation. This failure
was apparent on the face of the indictment before trial, and could be
raised without any need to anticipate the course of the trial evidence.
The most that can be said is that if Sanabria had expected that evidence
would be offered to connect him with the horse betting operation as well,
96.28 Number of businesses
98 S.Ct. at 2184 n. 33.
96.29 Government charges
The prospect that indictments may be
framed in multiple counts in order to
avoid the impact of the Sanabria decision
may underlie the dissenting suggestion of
Justice Blackmun that the case was "an
odd and an unusual one," that "will afford
little guidance as precedent in the Court's
continuing struggle to create order and
understanding out of the confusion of the

lengthening list of its decisions on the
Double Jeopardy Clause." 98 S.Ct. at
2187.
The Court itself recognized that in light of
the frequently arbitrary choice between
charging an offense in one or more counts,
the government may appeal a genuine
"dismissal" that embraces only part of a
single count. 98 S.Ct. at 2181 n. 23.

96.30 Mistrial analogy
See text at note 96.10 above.
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there would not have been as much incentive to raise the question prior to
trial. Even that argument rests on the assumption that there is any
incentive to raise such easily corrected matters prior to trial; whatever
force there may have been to that assumption, the result of the Sanabria
case is to encourage delay.
One final case must be summarized. In Finch v. United States 96·31 it
was taken that the case had been submitted to the district court for a
determination of guilt or innocence upon a stipulation of facts. 96·32 The
district court dismissed the information for failure to state an offense.
The court of appeals permitted an appeal by the government, concluding
that although jeopardy had attached, there would be no need for further
factfinding upon reversal; all that was required on appeal was a determination of law upon the stipulated facts. 96.33 The Supreme Court reversed,
ruling that absent a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, a verdict or general
finding of guilt by the trial court "is a necessary predicate to conviction."
A dismissal prior to any declaration of guilt or innocence precludes
appeal.
If indeed the Finch case was submitted for final judgment on a
stipulation of all the facts relevant to guilt, and dismissal rested solely on
a ruling of law as to the statutory elements of the offense charged, it
stands in a contrasting but complementary position to the Scott decision
as a qualification of the "further proceedings" test that had seemed to be
established by earlier decisions.96.34 Under the Scott decision, appeal is
permitted even though the result may be to require a complete new trial;
under the Finch decision, appeal is denied even though reversal could be
accomplished without any need for further trial court proceedings. As
the opinion is written, it appears to contemplate an appeal if the trial
court goes through the ritual of stating that upon the stipulated facts the
defendant is guilty if the law is as claimed by the government, but is not
guilty because the law is otherwise as understood by the trial court.
Absent such a ritual statement, the fact that the court of appeals is in a
position to dispose of the case without further factfinding proceedings
below is irrelevant. It is difficult to perceive the constitutional significance of such an exercise, but there is no apparent room in the terse and
summary disposition of the Finch case to avoid it. Once again, the result
seems to depend on a highly technical but as yet undefined concept of
acquittal. In this setting, however, it is difficult to support the result by
relying on the factfinding protective role of the trial judge. Indeed the
Finch case may have been tacitly overruled by the subsequent decision in
96.3 l Finch case
1977, 97 S.Ct. 2909, 433 U.S. 676, 53
L.Ed.2d 1048.
96.32 Submission on stipulation
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, found it far
from clear whether the submission
amounted to a waiver of the right to jury
trial and consent that the issue of guilt or
innocence be decided on the basis of the
stipulation by the district judge. 97 S.Ct.
at 2910-291 I.

96.33 Court of appeals
u. s. V. Finch, C.A.9th, 1976, 548 F.2d 822,
824-827, vacated 97 S.Ct. 2909, 433 U.S.
676, 53 L.Ed.2d 1048.
96.34 Further proceedings test
See the discussion at pages 666-668 in the
main volume.
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Swisher v. Brady 96.35 that double jeopardy principles do not prevent a
state from permitting exceptions by the government to reports of juvenile court masters that recommend dismissal of charges. It could be
argued that just as double jeopardy permits a state to split the original
factfinding chore between master and judge, so it should permit a
division between trial court and appellate court on a stipulated record.
The Swisher opinion, however, was careful to suggest that there is a
substantial difference between the structure of the tribunal that is
responsible for reaching the first final factfinding and a system in which
a second appellate tribunal reviews conclusions reached by a first tribunal
that is designed to accomplish final disposition of most cases. The best
reason for doubting the status of the Finch decision remains its own
intrinsic weakness.
One lesson is clearly taught by all these decisions. For all its troubles,
the Court is not yet prepared to accept the increasingly cogent argument
that the double jeopardy clause should not be read to bar government
appeals that rest only on matters of law. 96.36 Beyond this point, the
balance has shifted between the two main double jeopardy tests. Many
of the questions that would have had to be framed by focusing on the
need for further trial proceedings must now be redirected, often in terms
of the increasingly important but still vague concept of acquittal.
The most important applications of the acquittal concept are found in
the Finch and Sanabria cases. Together, they seem to stand for the
proposition that there is a final acquittal whenever the trial court
judgment has mingled findings or assumptions of fact as to elements of
the crime, even though the judgment was clearly controlled by mistaken
rulings of law and the facts found or assumed would not preclude
conviction on a proper view of the law. The absence of any explanation
for this proposition makes it a very uncertain task to speculate about its
reach. It may still be possible to adopt different tests for appeals than
for second prosecutions and to consider the defendant's failure to raise
before trial matters that clearly could have been raised. 96.37 The tone of
the opinions, however, appears to attach critical importance to the factbased nature of any judgment characterized as an acquittal. If so,
defendants will have every incentive to postpone matters until jeopardy
has attached, and then to frame them in terms of factual sufficiency
rather than legal oversight. Even in face of these strange consequences,
the focus on acquittal might make sense if it could be explained by an
96.35 Swisher case
1978, 98 S.Ct. 2699, 438 U.S. 204, 57
L.Ed.2d 705.
96.36 No appeal bar
See p. 678 and n. 84 in the main volume.
96.37 Defendant's failure
See the discussion at pages 677-684 in the
main volume.
One possible area in which the defendant's
failure to raise matters before trial may
still count in the balance could be the

suppression of evidence. A post-jeopardy
motion to suppress on grounds that were
clearly available and known to the defendant prior to trial might easily lead to a
directed judgment of acquittal for insufficiency of the evidence as reduced by the
suppression ruling. The opinion in the
Sanabria case does not speak directly to
this problem, and the setting is one in
which the policies underlying the Court's
emphasis on fact-based acquittals may be
found inapplicable.
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overriding concern to protect defendants against the burden of repeated
trial proceedings. The changed direction of the retrial test forecloses
even this explanation. All that remains is reliance on the role of the trial
judge as a supplemental protection against ill-advised factfinding or law
distortion by the jury.
The cumulative impact of these opinions and their ambiguities raises
new doubts about the rights of government appeal in other settings not
immediately before the Court. It is now doubtful whether the government can appeal from a fact-based judgment of acquittal entered after a
jury has returned a guilty verdict, or can appeal to raise questions of law
presented by the detailed factfindings prepared in a nonjury trial that has
resulted in dismissal or acquittal. Once again, the nature of the doubts
requires detailed statement.
The decision in United States v. Wilson 96.38 clearly establishes the right
of the government to appeal from a judgment of acquittal that rests on a
ruling of law made after a jury has returned a guilty verdict. The most
natural reading of the opinion was that the Court also intended to permit
an appeal if the judgment of acquittal rested on an evaluation of the
evidence.96•39 Reversal would not require further proceedings on the
question of guilt or innocence, but merely reinstatement of the verdict
and sentencing. Although there is a strange cautionary footnote in the
Scott case,96.4° it would be very easy to extend the Court's heavy emphasis
96.38 Wilson case
1975, 95 S.Ct. 1013, 420 U.S. 332, 43
L.Ed.2d 232, discussed at pages 663-666
in the main volume.
96.39 Assessment of evidence
See the discussion at page 665 in the main
volume.
Shortly before the most recent Supreme
Court decisions, the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit ruled squarely that the
Wilson decision permits a government appeal from a judgment of acquittal entered
for insufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's conviction. U. S. v. Schoenhut, C.A.3d, 1978, 576 F.2d 1010, 1018
n. 7.
96.40 Cautionary note
98 S.Ct. at 2193-2194 n. 7. The Court
notes that it had assumed in an earlier
opinion that a judgment of acquittal could
be appealed where no retrial would be
needed on remand, and that "[d]espite the
Court's heavy emphasis on the finality of
an acquittal in Martin Linen and Sanabria
v. United States, * * * neither decision explicitly repudiates this assumption."
Since no further trial proceedings would
be required, the decision in the Wilson
case established the right of the government to appeal from a judgment of acquittal entered on issues of law notwithstand-

ing a jury verdict of guilty. U. S. v. Hannah, C.A.3d, 1978, 584 F.2d 27, 28.
In u. S. V. Blasco, C.A.7th, 1978, 581 F.2d
681, the court permitted the government
to appeal from a judgment of acquittal
entered on the ground that the evidence in
support of the count on which the jury
had convicted was no more credible than
the evidence on the counts on which the
jury had acquitted. The court examined
the 1978 decisions of the Supreme Court,
and concluded that appeal is not precluded by the fact that the trial court rested
acquittal on evidentiary factual considerations, so long as reversal will not require
further trial court proceedings.
The government could appeal from a judg- ·
ment of acquittal entered on the defendant's motion for new trial following conviction by the jury. "Where the jury returns a verdict of guilty, but the trial court
thereafter enters a judgment of acquittal
for insufficiency of the evidence, the
government may appeal, and reinstatement of the jury verdict thereafter wou.ld
not offend the Double Jeopardy Clause."
U.S. v. Jones, C.A.6th, 1978, 580 F.2d 219,
221 n. 3.
The Fifth Circuit has found support in the
Scott decision to renew its ruling that the
government can appeal from a judgment
of acquittal entered for insufficiency of the
evidence following conviction by a jury.
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on fact-based acquittals in the more recent decisions to this setting, and
to conclude that the trial court's evaluation of the evidence should protect
the defendant against jury and appellate court alike.
A second and more convoluted line of argument is also available to
support the conclusion that the government may not appeal from a
fact-based judgment of acquittal entered after a jury verdict of guilt. In
Burks v. United States 96·41 the court ruled that a defendant may not be
retried after a court of appeals has reversed a conviction for insufficiency
of the evidence. One of the reasons advanced was that the trial court
"had erred in failing to grant a judgment of acquittal" and retrial should
no more be permitted after acquittal on appeal than after a "correct
decision" by the trial court. 96•42 By the same reasoning, it could be argued
that so long as the defendant had made a motion for acquittal before the
case was submitted to the jury, the judgment of acquittal entered by the
court after conviction by the jury represents the court's own determination that it should have acquitted without submitting the case to the jury.
This reasoning would leave room for the argument that the government
could appeal if the defendant had not sought a judgment of acquittal
before the case was submitted,96-'3 but it would be easy to respond that
the right of appeal should not depend on such procedural trivia. An
U. S. v. Clemones, C.A.5th, 1978, 577 F.2d
1247, 1255.
In a decision handed down nine days after
the Scott and Sanabria decisions but taking no note of them, it was ruled that the
government could appeal from a judgment
of acquittal entered after conviction by a
jury since no further trial proceedings
would be required upon reversal, even
though the acquittal had rested on appraisal of the factual evidence adduced at
trial. U. S. v. Dreitzler, C.A.9th, 1978, 577
F.2d 539, 544 & n. 7.

But see
In U. S. v. Burroughs, C.A.4th, 1977, 564
F.2d 1111, 1116-1119, the court wrote its
third opinion on the right of the government to appeal from a judgment of acquittal entered after the jury had found the
defendants guilty of intercepting oral communications. Initially the court had dismissed the appeal. Then, following the
1975 decisions of the Supreme Court, it
reinstated the appeal on the ground that
reversal would not require further proceedings, but could be perfected by entering judgment on the jury's verdict. Thereafter, it adhered to the decision that the
appeal could stand in light of the decision
in the Martin Linen Supply case. The
third ruling, however, was rested on the
conclusion that the judgment of acquittal
had not involved any resolution of issues
as to the sufficiency of the evidence. Instead, it was found that the trial court had
interpreted the controlling statute to require proof of an element as to which no
evidence was offered, and as to which the

jury was not instructed. The question
thus framed was found to present only a
question of law on appeal. And it was
assumed that if the judgment of acquittal
"represents the resolution of a factual
rather than a legal question the government cannot appeal." 564 F.2d at 1118.
Judge Widener, moreover, dissented on
the ground that since in his view the acquittal had rested on the insufficiency of
the evidence, the appeal must be dismissed.
Since it was clear that the judgments of
acquittal entered by the trial court following jury convictions were grounded entirely on technical legal considerations that
did not involve any factual determinations, the government could appeal. U. S.
v. Quarry, C.A.!Oth, 1978, 576 F.2d 830,
832-833.

96.41 Burks case
1978, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 437 U.S. 1, 57 L.Ed.2d
I.
96.42 Erroneous denial of acquittal
98 S.Ct. at 2147.
96.43 No pre-verdict motion
Criminal Rule 29(c) was amended in 1966
to delete the former requirement that a
motion for judgment of acquittal be made
at the close of all the evidence in order to
support a post-verdict motion. See 2
Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure:
Criminal § 465.
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alternative argument is also suggested by the Burks decision. It could be
urged that it is anomalous to preclude retrial in the event of appellate
reversal for insufficiency of the evidence after both jury and trial judge
have found the evidence sufficient, but to permit retrial if the jury
convicts but the trial judge who is thoroughly familiar with the trial then
acquits.
Every effort should be made to resist the conclusion that appeal is
precluded by a trial court judgment of acquittal for insufficiency of the
evidence after a jury guilty verdict.. As compared to an acquittal entered
before a verdict is returned or to appellate reversal after a final judgment, the critical distinction is that appeal can be effective without any
need for further trial proceedings. The fact that appeal may now be
permitted in some settings despite the need for further trial proceedings
does not reduce the importance of this distinction. And any need to
preserve the protective factfinding role of the district judge can be
implemented through the standards for appellate review. If the need be
found, the standard could even be that courts of appeals must accept the
trial court's evaluation of the evidence. Even under that standard, there
would be room for appeal to test the legal determinations bound up with
the acquittal. Reverting to the example of the Sanabria case, a post-verdict acquittal based on failure to prove that Sanabria was personally
connected with the horse betting operation should at least be subject to
review of the question whether such proof was required to support a jury
conviction.
The problems that arise with respect to nonjury trials may be stated
much more quickly. Although no government appeal can be taken from a
general judgment of acquittal entered without further explanation, it
remains safe to assume that an appeal can be taken if there is first a
general finding of guilt that is then followed by a changed view of the
law 96M or by suppression of evidence that had supported the original
conclusion. 96•45 It is not safe, however, to assume the continued validity of
96.44 Changed view of law
The Court apparently assumed in the
Finch case that a government appeal
could be taken if a trial judge first made a
general finding of guilt, and then retracted
it on the basis of a changed view of the
law. See text following note 96.33 above.
The government was allowed to appeal in
U. S. v. Kopp, 1976, 97 S.Ct. 400, 429 U.S.
121, 50 L.Ed.2d 336, where the trial judge
found the defendant guilty, but then dismissed the indictment before sentencing
on the basis of a suppression ruling made
in light of an intervening Supreme Court
decision. The right to appeal was rested
on the ground that success would simply
result in reinstatement of the finding of
guilt rather than further proceedings on
the question of guilt.
A like result was reached in U. S. v. Ceccolini, 1978, 98 S.Ct. 1054, 1057, 435 U.S.
268, 55 L.Ed.2d 268. The trial court found

the defendant guilty after a bench trial,
but immediately after the finding of guilt
granted a motion to suppress specified
testimony, and set aside the guilty "verdict" on the ground that without the suppressed testimony there was insufficient
evidence of guilt. "The District Court
* * * sensibly first made its finding on
the factual question of guilt or innocence,
and then ruled on the motion to suppress;
a reversal of these rulings would require
no further proceedings in the District
Court, but merely a reinstatement of the
finding of guilt."

96.45 Suppression of evidence
Within the period allowed for government
appeal from an order suppressing evidence and dismissing an indictment the
district court has power to vacate the order. U. S. v. Emens, C.A.9th, 1977, 565
F.2d 1142.
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the conclusion that appeal should also be available to test a government
claim that special findings of fact against the defendant establish all of
the elements legally required for conviction.96.441 The Court's unexplained
reliance on the preemptive effect of judgments that are characterized as
fact-based acquittals and the absence of any general finding of guilt may
be extended to defeat any right to appeal. Once again, this extension
should not be accepted. Here as in jury tried cases appeal should be
available to resolve questions of law so long as reversal can be had
without further trial proceedings.
The uncertainties opened up by these current decisions may be alleviated if the government anticipates an issue and raises it before jeopardy
has attached. In United States v. Abraham,96.47 the government moved
before trial for a ruling on the adequacy of the procedure that had been
used in sealing recordings made pursuant to a court interception order.
The district court responded with an order that finally suppressed and
excluded the intercepted evidence from trial~The defendants sought
dismissal of the government appeal on the ground that the government
could not seek such a ruling in the absence of a pretrial motion to
suppress by the defense. The court of appeals ruled that the procedure
chosen by the government was proper, and that an appeal was available.
This device may be· seized upon by the government to explore and
attempt to expand its right to raise matters before trial whenever there is
a risk that an issue may be disposed of after jeopardy has attached in a
form that might be found on acquittal. It does not seem likely, however,
that the government can anticipate many of the arguments that seem
wrong to it and that yet may be found persuasive by a trial court.
96.46 Special findings
See pages 667-668 in the main volume.

96.4 7 Abraham case
C.A.6th, 1976, 541 F.2d 624, 626.

